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I. INTRODUCTION
Where, as in Nebraska, the legislation concerning the conserva-
tion of oil and gas is woefully inadequate,1 the waste caused by com-
petitive tract-by-tract development of oil and gas fields can be
avoided only by voluntary agreement. Generally, voluntary agree-
ments eliminate the competition and the waste caused thereby by
effecting a combination of the opposing interests. This paper is
intended to introduce the reader to some of the problems raised
by those combinations.
To understand these problems, it is necessary to have a general
knowledge of the relationship between an oil and gas lessor and
his lessee. Generally, an interest in oil and gas in place is an inter-
est in real property.2 This interest is afforded the usual protection
that real property interests receive, but with some modifications.
The most .important modifications result from the uniformly ac-
t For, an excellent book upon which this paper relies heavily, the reader
is referred to Leo J. Hoffman, Voluntary Pooling and Unitization (Matthew
Bender & Company 1954).
* B.S. 1953, LL.B. 1957, University of Nebraska; member American, Ne-
braska State, and Hall County Bar Associations; presently associated with
the firm of Luebs & Elson, Grand Island, Nebraska.
1 Four sections of the Nebraska Revised Statutes (Reissue of 1952) are
concerned with the conservation of oil and gas. Section 57-215 authorizes
the State Geologist to require, inter alia, ". . . (3) The drilling, casing, and
plugging of wells in such manner as to prevent (a) the escape of oil or gas
from one stratum to another, (b) the intrusion of water into oil or gas
stratum, (c) the pollution of fresh water supplies by oil, gas, salt water, or
brackish water, and (d) blow outs, explosions, and fires. .. " Section 57-225
defines waste, and Section 57-226 provides that waste "... is hereby pro-
hibited." Section 57-217 makes the violation of Section 57-215 a misde-
meanor, but no penalty is provided for a violation of Section 57-226. For
an interesting contrast see the discussion of the Oklahoma conservation
legislation in Murphy, Conservation of Oil and Gas 369 et seq. (1949).
2 Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law 41 (1955); 1 Summers, The Law
of Oil and Gas 29 (Perm. Ed.).
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cepted rule of capture and the equally well settled offset drilling
rule. The former provides that the surface owner who extracts
oil through his land owns that oil whether it originally underlaid
his land or not.3 The offset drilling rule limits the remedy of a
landowner whose land is drained by another to the self-help relief
he can achieve by drilling a well on his own property to intercept
the oil before it is drained. 4 In practice, these rules result in intense
competition among the surface owners for the oil which underlies
their property in a common reservoir.
Because most surface owners have neither the funds nor the
disposition to develop the oil or gas beneath their properties, they
usually enter an agreement to have the property developed by
others. The agreement takes the form of an oil and gas lease.
It usually provides that the lessor shall receive Vs of the oil
or gas that is produced from his land,5 and that the lessee shall
take the other 7/8. Sometimes it simply provides that the lessor
shall be paid a certain sum of money for each well that the lessee
drills.6 In either case, the lessor is primarily interested in the early
development of the property.
The lease may also provide for the term it is to run7 for the
amount of delay rental the lessee must pay to keep the lease in
3 Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. St. 235,
18 Atl. 724 (1889); Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558,
4 A.L.R.2d 191 (1948); Sullivan, op. cit. supra, at 45; Hardwicke, The Rule
of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 Texas L. Rev.
391 (1935); Shank, Present Status of the Law of Capture, Sixth Annual
Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, 257 (1955). (References to the
Annual Institutes in this article refer to the Southwestern Legal Foundation
Institutes.)
4 Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 Atl. 801
(1907); Sullivan, op. cit. supra note 2, at 46; 1 Summers, op. cit supra note 2,
at 161.
5 This fraction is called the royalty interest. In addition to it, the lessor
may receive a "bonus" for signing the lease. Sullivan, Handbook of Oil
and Gas Law 126 (1955); see also, State ex rel Fatzer v. Board of Regents,
176 Kan. 179, 269 P.2d 425 (1954); and Carroll v. Bowen, 180 Okla. 215, 68
P.2d 773 (1937).
6 This was customary in the earlier gas leases. However, it is becoming
increasingly common to provide for royalty payments. Merrill, Covenants
Implied in Oil and Gas Leases 16 (1940).
7 This is called the primary term. The lease will be extended beyond the
primary term when and so long as production is obtained in paying quan-
tities. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co. v. Callender, 84 Mont. 178, 274 Pac.
834 (1929); Litten v. Geisler, 80 Ohio App. 491, 76 N.E.2d 741 (1947); Hen-
nessy v. Junction Oil and Gas Co., 75 Okla. 220, 182 Pac. 666 (1919); Garcia
v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
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force without drilling,8 for the surrender of all or part of the lease,9
for the use that may be made of the surface, and for infinite other
details.10 However, the majority of leases fail to prescribe the
extent of the exploration, development, operation, protection against
drainage, and the diligence with which these shall be carried on."
Thus, the determination of those matters is left to the courts' con-
struction of the lease.
This judicial construction has established that certain covenants
are implied in the lease. One of these is the implied covenant to
drill an exploratory well.12 This covenant may be satisfied by the
payment of delay rentals.13 Another is the implied covenant to
reasonably develop the lease by the drilling of additional wells.
14
A third is the implied covenant "for diligent and proper opera-
tion,' '15 or "to diligently operate and market."'16 A fourth is the
8 Two types of clauses are common. One provides that the lessee must
drill or pay delay rentals after a specified date. The other provides that if
no well is commenced by a specified date the lease will terminate unless
the lessee pays delay rentals. The unless clause will cause an automatic
forfeiture if the lessee neither drills nor pays. The lessee's inaction under an
or clause amounts to the breach of a condition subsequent and affirmative
action by the lessor is necessary to terminate the lease. Sullivan, Handbook
of Oil and Gas Law 104-106 (1955); see also McElroy, Unless vs. Or: An Ap-
praisal, 6 Baylor L. Rev. 415 (1954); and Braly, Problems Presented by
Operations During The Primary Term of an Oil and Gas Lease, Sixth Annual
Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, 189 (1955).
9 Typically, the clause provides: "Lessee may at any time surrender this
lease in whole or in part, by delivering or mailing a release thereof of
record in the proper county." Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law 196
(1955). See Rhoads Drilling Co. v. Allred, 70 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934); McKee v. Grimm, 111 Okla. 24, 238 Pac. 835 (1925).
10 For example, the lease may provide that the lessee may not drill
within a specified radius from a dwelling, that the lessee must pay for any
damage to growing crops, and that the lessee must bury all pipe lines below
plow depth. Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law 156-157 (1955). See
also Terry, Miscellaneous Clauses in Oil and Gas Leases, Second Annual
Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, 237 (1951).
11 Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases 20 (1940).
12 State ex rel Commissioners v. Couch, 298 P.2d 452 (Okla. 1956);
Witt v. Westheimer, 182 Okla. 645, 79 P.2d 250 (1938); McKee v. Thornton, 79
Okla. 138, 192 Pac. 212 (1920); Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas
Leases 48 (1940).
13 Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law 168 (1955).
14 Burnett v. R. Lacy, Inc., 293 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Link v.
State's Oil Corp., 229 S.W. 693 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); 2 Summers, The Law of
Oil and Gas 311 (Perm. Ed.); Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas
Leases 128 (1940).
15 Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases, 182 (1940).
16 Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law 173 (1955).
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implied covenant to protect the premises against drainage.17
In addition to setting the relationship between the lessee and
his lessor,18 the implied covenants operate to put lessees vis-a-vis
lessees in the same competitive position as their lessors.19 Because
of this competition,
. . . each new pool was drilled and exhausted as rapidly as
was physically possible in the effort by each producer to get his
oil to the surface and reduced to possession, whether or not a market
existed for the oil. Waste was inherent in the manner of produc-
tion and was inevitable, both underground and at the surface.
Oil that could not be absorbed by current demands had to be stored,
usually for a long period, and frequently in earthen pits. Fire,
leakage, evaporation, and deterioration took a severe toll. Prices
were periodically depressed to absurdly low levels, business and
employment were disrupted, and cheap oil was squandered. Under-
ground loss of oil was tremendous, for only that oil was recovered
that would flow readily into a well under immediate available
underground forces, the remainder being left in the ground. The
natural gas associated with the oil was blown to the atmosphere
and burned, for conditions did not permit its recovery and utiliza-
tion.... 20
II. THE COMMUNITY LEASE
In one fact situation, the implied covenants virtually force the
lessee into competition with himself. This occurs when the lessee
obtains separate leases from the respective owners of contiguous
tracts. If the lessee obtains production on one tract and drains the
hydrocarbons underlying both tracts, it is not unlikely that both
lessors will seek to share in the production. The owner of the well
tract is, by the express terms of his lease, entitled to the full royalty
on all of the production.21 The owner of the non-well tract is en-
'7 Blake v. The Texas Co., 123 F.Supp. 73 (E.D. Okla. 1954); Hay v. Shell
Petroleum Co., 30 F.Supp. 663 (W.D. Okla 1939); Poindexter v. Lion Oil &
Refining Co., 205 Ark. 978, 167 S.W.2d 492 (1943); Ramsey Petroleum Corp.
v. Davis, 184 Okla. 155, 85 P.2d 427 (1938); Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and
Gas Law 176 (1955).
18 For an article dealing with the relationship between language in the
lease and the implied covenants see Merrill, Lease Clauses Affecting Implied
Covenants, Second Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, 141
(1951).
19 The lessee is held either to the standard of "the reasonably prudent
operator" or to a standard of "good faith." The first requires him to do
what an ordinary prudent operator would do; the second leaves the deter-
mination of what to do entirely to the lessee, providing that he acts in good
faith. Shell Oil Co. v. Howell, 208 Okla. 598, 258 P.2d 661 (1953); Ramsey
Petroleum Corporation v. Davis, 184 Okla. 155, 85 P.2d 427 (1938).
2o Buckley, Petroleum Conservation 8 (1951).
21 See note 5, supra.
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titled to the protection of the implied covenant to prevent drain-
age.22 Therefore, the lessee must drill an offset well, compensate
the non-well tract owner by the payment of damages, 23 or suffer
the termination of his lease on the non-well tract.
24
It is now common practice for lessees to seek to avoid that situ-
ation by having the owners of contiguous tracts jointly execute
one lease that describes both of their tracts as a whole. The usual
lease, so executed, then becomes a community lease.25 The important
differences between the usual lease and the community lease are,
first, that the property description in the community lease includes
land that is separately owned by two or more persons, and second,
that those separate owners are collectively described as the lessor
in the community lease. The important similarities between the
two leases are that both provide that the production from any part
of the described tract will stop the requirement for delay rentals
and extend the lease beyond the primary term.26 Both also pro-
vide that the royalties will be paid to those who are collectively
described as the lessors.
A. THE EFFECT OF A COMMUNITY LEASE
By obtaining a community lease from the owners of contigu-
ous tracts, the lessee insures that he will have to pay the specified
royalties, and no more,27 on any production that is obtained from
22 However, in this fact situation compliance with the prudent operator
or good faith tests, supra note 19, will not relieve the lessee of liability, for
he is bound by an implied covenant to do nothing to impair the value of the
lease. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette, 221 Miss. 1, 72 So.2d 176 (1954);
Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W.Va. 433, 89 S.E. 12 (1916).
23 The damages may be measured by the cost of an offset well, Fite v.
Miller, 192 La. 229, 187 So. 650 (1939); or the amount of royalties that the
lessor would have received if the well had been completed. Waldrip v.
Hamon, 136 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Okla. 1955); see also Symposium on the Okla-
homa Law of Damages, 6 Okla. L. Rev. 289, 358 (1953); and Hart, Damages
and Other Relief for Breach of Express and Implied Covenants in Oil and
Gas Leases and Drilling Agreements, Seventh Annual Institute on Oil and
Gas Law and Taxation 47 (1956).
24 If an implied covenant is given the force of a condition, the alternative
of damages or termination rests with the lessor. Four Brotherhood Oil Co.
v. Kelly, 235 S.W. 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
23 The term community lease is preferred to the term joint lease because
the latter can as well signify any lease in which two or more mineral owners
join, including ordinary co-tenants in a unified tract of land. Hoffman,
Voluntary Pooling and Unitization 9 (1954).
26 See notes 7 and 8, supra.
27 Note particularly that the lessee will save the expense of offset wells
and that he will not be required to share this saving with the lessors.
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either tract. He also insures that production from either tract will
continue the lease as to both tracts. Thus, the relationship between
the lessee and his lessors under a community lease is identical to
the relationship between the lessee and the lessor of the usual
oil and gas lease.
B. THE INTENTION TO SHARE
However, the relationship between the lessors is usually not
expressed in the community lease. Thus, when the lessee obtains
production on only one of the communitized tracts, the question of
whether the owner of the non-well tract should be allowed to par-
ticipate in that production is left for the courts. All of the juris-
dictions which have dealt with this question agree that the answer
is a function of the lessors' intention, and it is uniformly recog-
nized that an express provision in the lease will be controlling.28
When the parties have not expressed a contrary intention, three
factors weigh heavily in favor of sharing. First, in the ordinary
commercial transaction, it may reasonably be presumed that the
parties intended their execution of a community lease to have a
different effect than the execution of separate leases. Second, the
owner of the non-well tract, bound by the terms of the lease,2 9
would receive no income from that lease unless he was entitled to
participate in the production from the well tract or production was
subsequently obtained upon his tract. Third, under a rule of non-
sharing, the interests of the well tract owner would be as adverse
to the interests of the non-well tract owner as they would have
been if a community lease had not been executed. This would
make it difficult for them to agree that further exploration and
development was or was not prudent and would hinder their en-
forcement of the express and implied covenants.
The majority of jurisdictions follow these factors to their ex-
treme and hold that the execution of a community lease gives rise
to a conclusive presumption that the parties intended to share the
production.3 0 Although this rule may not give effect to the in-
2 8 Hoffman, op. cit. supra note 25, at 10.
29 The development of either tract keeps the lease alive as to the other.
Nabors v. Producers' Oil Co., 140 La. 985, 74 So. 527 (1917). See also McCam-
mon v. The Texas Co. 137 F. Supp. 256 (D. Kan. 1954).
30 Petroleum Midway Co. v. Moynier, 205 Cal. 733, 272 Pac. 740, 743 (1928);
Higgins v. California Petroleum and Asphalt Co., 109 Cal. 304, 41 Pac. 1087
(1895); French v. George, 159 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Parker v.
Parker, 144 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Hamilton v. McCall Drilling
Co., 131 W.Va. 750, 50 S.E.2d 482 (1948); Lynch v. Davis, 79 W.Va. 437, 92 S.E
427 (1917).
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tention of the parties in a particular case, it is laudable from the
title examiner's viewpoint; for, when consistently followed, it has
the finality of a rule of property. Furthermore, once it is so estab-
lished, this rule gives the community lease a definite legal effect
that all property owners may be presumed to know.
Oklahoma has not gone that far. Its rule is that the community
lease gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the lessors intended
to share the production.31 This presumption may be rebutted
by the terms of the lease, by other oral or written agreements, or
by the conduct of the lessors. This rule is more likely to give effect
to the intention of particular lessors, but it does not give the sub-
sequent purchaser of one of the communitized tracts the assurance
that is afforded by the majority rule.
Only one case seems to have accepted the antithesis of either
the majority rule or the Oklahoma rule.3 2 That is Lusk v. Green,33
in which the Oklahoma court apparently held that a bare com-
munity lease to non-contiguous tracts gives rise to a presumption
that the parties did not intend to share the production from either
tract.34 However, the Louisiana court came very close to adopting
the alternative that a community lease gives rise to neither a pre-
sumption that the parties intended to share nor a presumption that
they did not intend to share.35 Such a rule may seem reasonable on
its face, but its practical effect makes it untenable. To illustrate,
assume that the lessee paid all of the royalties from community
lease production to the owner of the well tract. If the owner of
the non-well tract wished to participate in that production and the
lease did not give rise to either presumption, he would have to
allege an intention to share in addition to the existence of the
lease in order to state a cause of action. Having alleged the inten-
tion to share, he would have the burden of proving that fact. If
31 Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Tipken, 190 Okla. 396, 124 P.2d 418 (1942).
3 2 However, in another fact situation the majority of courts employ the
opposite reasoning. Thus, where land is subdivided subject to an existing
lease it is generally held that, in the absence of an agreement to the con-
trary, production from any of the subdivided tracts shall not be apportioned
among the other tracts. Galt v. Metscher, 103 Okla. 271, 229 Pac. 522 (1923);
Japhet v. McRae, 276 S.W. 669 (Tex. Com. App. 1925); Walker v. West Vir-
ginia Gas Corp., 121 W.Va 251, 3 S.E.2d 55 (1939).
33 114 Okla. 113, 245 Pac. 636 (1926).
34 Unless it can be distinguished from Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Tipken,
supra note 31, on the ground that it considered a community lease to non-
contiguous tracts, Lusk v. Green does not state the current Oklahoma rule.
35 Louisiana Canal Co. v. Heyd, 189 La. 903, 181 So. 439, 116 A.L.R. 1260
(1938).
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there was no evidence of the lessors' intention other than the
language of the community lease, or if the additional evidence did
not preponderate in favor of either intention, he would not be en-
titled to share. Note, however, that if the lessee had allocated the
proceeds between the owners of both tracts and the well tract
owner had alleged an intention not to share, the result on the
same facts would have been the opposite, and the non-well tract
owner would have been entitled to share. Therefore, under the
alternative rule that a community lease gives rise to neither pre-
sumption, the result in a given case may turn upon the lessee's
fortuitous payment to the well tract owner or to the owners of
both tracts.36 Thus to use this alternative is to dispose of the policy
considerations by disregarding them.3 7
Furthermore, it should be noted that several fact situations
may arise in which evidence of the lessors' intention is quite scarce.
Three examples which have been litigated follow. First, in
Louisiana Canal Co. v. Heyd,38 Heyd sold part of his land to the
plaintiff and then executed a lease which described the entire
tract. Plaintiff ratified the lease by accepting delay rentals from
the lessee. The court held that ".... the contract became a joint lease
by plaintiff's acceptance of it and that the parties intended to pool
their interests. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)39 Second, in Irick v.
Hubbel,40 plaintiff and several other tract owners each executed
separate but identical leases which described the entire acreage
owned by them. Plaintiff was asked to sign a separate unitization
agreement, but she refused. Plaintiff brought an action to obtain
the full royalty from production on her tract, and testified "...
that she never had any conversation with defendants about the
well or made any agreement with the other owners of mineral
interests under the 80-acre tract described in the lease .... "41 The
court relied upon the rebuttable presumption rule of the Peerless42
case and held that the lessors intended to share in the production
as ". . . plaintiff made no proof of any agreement or expressed
36 Cf. Clark v. Elsinore Oil & Refining Co., infra note 48, where action
of the lessee was held to have no effect on the lessors' intention.
37 See Professor Stone's discussion of "The Legal Category of Meaningless
Reference." Stone, The Province and Function of Law 171 (1950).
38 Supra, note 35.
39 181 So. at 445.
40 280 P.2d 733 (Okla. 1955).
41280 P.2d at 734.
42 Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Tipken, supra note 31.
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intention between the lessors to the contrary. ' '43 Third, in Ward
v. Golke,44 a widow executed an oil and gas lease which described
four tracts. In three of the tracts she held an undivided one-half
interest and a life estate in the remaining one-half interest. In the
fourth tract she had a life estate. She was joined in this lease by
the remaindermen who were to take after the expiration of her
life estates. Production was obtained on the fourth tract. At the
widow's death, the remaindermen of the fourth tract brought an
action to recover the full amount of the royalties. The Texas court
applied its standard rule that the joint execution of a lease compels
the sharing of production.45
In each of those cases the courts were able to reach a result
which is equitable from the objective point of view without benefit
of evidence which preponderated toward either intention of the
lessors. The achieving of such a result would not have been so
easy under the alternative rule that the lease gives rise to neither
presumption.
C. THE BASIS OF PARTICIPATION
By deciding that the lessors in a given case intend to share
the production from any part of a community lease, the courts
necessarily raise the question of the basis of that participation.
Did the parties intend to share on the basis of their contributed
surface acreage, on the basis of the relative value of their tracts,
or on the basis of some combination of these factors? Where a con-
trary intention is not expressed, the courts uniformly hold that
the parties intended to share on the basis of their contributed
surface acreage. 46
This basis may be easily and accurately applied, but it bears
only a coincidental and improbable relationship to the value of the
tracts or the result that the parties probably would have agreed
to if they had known that relative value. For example, assume
43 280 P.2d at 735.
44 279 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
45 See also Langrebe v. Rock Hill Oil Co., 273 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954).
46 Petroleum Midway Co. v. Moynier, 205 Cal. 733, 272 Pac. 740 (1928);
Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Tipken, 190 Okla 396, 124 P.2d 418 (1942);
French v. George, 159 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Hamilton v. McCall
Drilling Co., 131 W.Va. 750, 50 S.E.2d 482 (1948). But see Higgins v. Cali-
fornia Petroleum and Asphalt Co., 109 Cal. 304, 41 Pac. 1087 (1895), which
holds that the apportionment should be on a "comparative value" basis.
This case has never been followed on this point. Hoffman, Voluntary Pool-
ing and Unitization 30 (1954).
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that A and B, who severally own contiguous forty acre tracts,
join in a community lease which describes both tracts. Assume
further that only twenty of their eighty acres overlie economically
recoverable oil or gas. Depending on where-that twenty acres lies
relative to the surface property lines, the application of the acreage
basis fortuitously allocates an undue share to A, an undue share to
B, or the proper share to each.
Moreover, the courts hold that the participation of each lessor
is determined by the amount of acreage he originally contributes.
Therefore, when the lessee surrenders 47 part of one of the tracts,
the owner of that tract is still entitled to participate on the basis
of the amount of acreage he had originally contributed. 48 Further-
more, he will be entitled to that participation even though he
subsequently obtains production on the surrendered acreage in
which the other community lessors are not entitled to participate. 49
D. THE CROSS-CONVEYANCING DOCTRINE
If the potential litigation of the issue of the parties' intention
to share and the possible inequitable effect of acreage basis shariiik
are not enough to deter lessors from signing community leases, the
cross-conveyancing doctrine should be. Under that doctrine the act
of entering a community lease effects a cross-conveyance of the
lessors' royalty interest so that each becomes a joint tenant in the
unitized whole.50
This doctrine is an extension of the majority rule that the
intent to share will be conclusively presumed from a community
lease which does not contain an express provision to the contrary.51
For that reason it is noteworthy that the cross-conveyancing doc-
trine and the conclusive presumption have opposite effects on titles
to property. The conclusive presumption tells the title examiner
that the royalty owner of each tract has the right to share in the
unitized production; but the cross-conveyancing doctrine puts the
ownership of each royalty interest in all of the lessors, even though
47 See supra, note 9.
48 Clark v. Elsinore Oil Co., 138 Cal.App. 6, 31 P.2d 476 (1934); and see First
National Bank of Redondo v. Standard Oil Co., 91 Cal.App. 705, 267 Pac. 548(1928) where the lease expressly provided that participation would continue
after surrender.
49 Tanner v. Olds, 29 Cal.2d 110, 173 P.2d 6 (1946); Tanner v. Title Insur-
ance and Trust Co., 20 Cal.2d 814, 129 P.2d 383 (1942).
50 Hoffman, Voluntary Pooling and Unitization 102 (1954).
51 Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W.2d 472 (1942).
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one or more of them may have had defective titles. 52 Thus, on the
one hand, all of the unitized lessors will be necessary parties to an
action to try title to the royalty interests of any one of the tracts ,53
and, on the other hand, the grantee in a conveyance which describes
only one of the tracts will not be entitled to participate in pro-
duction from any of the other tracts.5 4 Presumably, this rule will
also apply to devisees who take a described tract subsequent to its
inclusion in a community lease.55 Therefore, when the royalty inter-
est in a communitized tract is to be conveyed, that interest must
be described with great care, and the description must not be limited
to the legal description of the tract.
E. EFFECT IN NEBRASKA
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not decided a case concern-
ing community leases. Therefore, the execution of such a lease
in this State remains an open invitation to extensive litigation
among lessors, their heirs, and their assigns. In light of the Heyd56
and Irick57 cases, this litigation will be avoided only if all lessors
refuse to execute any lease which describes more land than they are
individually entitled to lease unless that lease carefully expresses
the intention of the lessor.
III. THE POOLING CLAUSE
Competitive tract-by-tract development may also be arrested
by the use of the pooling clause that is contained in the usual oil
and gas lease. In its simplest form, this clause provides that the
lessee shall have the power to pool all or any part of the leased
52 Gillis v. Royalty Service Corp., 91 Cal.App.2d 365, 204 P.2d 968 (1949).
53Belt v. The Texas Co., 175 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Veal v.
Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W.2d 472 (1942). Compare, Douglas v. Butcher,
272 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Jurek, 248
S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
54Boren v. Burgess, 97 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Okla. 1951); Tanner v. Title
Insurance Co., 20 Cal.2d 814, 129 P.2d 383 (1942).
55 But cf. Long v. Knox, 291 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1956), where the heir of a
community lessor was entitled to share under a clause in the lease which
provided that "all royalties occurring thereunder shall be treated as an
entirety and shall be divided among and paid to the separate owners" on
the acreage basis. See also Hardwicke and Hardwicke, Apportionment of
Royalty to Separate Tracts: The Entirety Clause and Community Lease, 32
Texas L. Rev. 660, 2 Oil and Gas Law from the Texas Law Review 2018
(1954).
56Louisiana Canal Co. v. Heyd, supra, note 35.
57 Irick v. Hubbel, supra, note 40.
COMMUNITY LEASES
premises with other tracts. Usually, however, the pooling clause
goes on to provide that for all purposes except the determination of
royalties production on any of the pooled tracts shall constitute
production on the leased premises, and that the proceeds of any
production will be allocated on a specified basis.58 It may also limit
the total number of acres that may be pooled.5 9
By interpretation, the courts have further restricted the opera-
tion of the pooling clause. For example, the lessee must exercise
good faith,60 and cannot, therefore, pool productive land with land
that is known to be unproductive.61 Also, he may pool the leased
premises only if the lessors of all of the tracts involved have given
him similar authority.62
The pooling clause must be definite enough to meet the usual
contract law standard of definiteness. In addition, in those states
which accept the cross-conveyancing doctrine, it must be definite
enough to meet the standard of the rule against perpetuities. The
latter problem has been raised by lessors who were seeking to avoid
the effect of pooling. They have argued that since under the cross-
conveyancing doctrine pooling constitutes a conveyance of an inter-
est in land, the pooling clause establishes a power to convey an
interest in land. If, as is usual, the pooling clause does not contain
a restriction as to time, it follows that it is void under the rule
against perpetuities. The courts have two answers to this argument.
The first is that the interests vest immediately upon the execution
and delivery of the lease.63 The second is that the power to pool
must be exercised within a reasonable time, which is a priori with-
in the time limit of the rule against perpetuities.6 4 Under these
theories the problem of remoteness in so far as it concerns pooling
clauses has been pretty well laid to rest.
However, the other problems raised by the cross-conveyancing
doctrine of community leasing may apply with full vigor to units
58 Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law 150 et seq. (1955).
59 Hoffman, Voluntary Pooling and Unitization 89 (1954).
60 Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, 217 F.2d 63 (10 Cir. 1954); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10 Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
947 (1955).
61 Imes v. Globe Oil and Refining Co., 184 Okla. 79, 84 P.2d 1106 (1938).
62 Viator v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., 230 La. 132, 88 So.2d 1 (1956);
Union Oil Co. v. Touchet, 229 La. 316, 86 So.2d 50 (1956).
63 Kenoyer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 173 Kan. 183, 245 P.2d 176 (1952).
64 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10 Cir. 1954).
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created by the pooling clause. 65 Thus, in jurisdictions which accept
the cross-conveyancing doctrine, if the lessor is to know the status
of his title he must insist that the pooling clause contain an express
provision that he does not intend to give the lessee power to convey
all or any part of his mineral interests.
Similarly, if the lessor wishes to avoid the possible hardships
of the acreage basis of allocating unit production, he must insist
that a more equitable basis be expressed in the pooling clause.
In addition, if the pooling clause purports to give the lessee
power to pool all or any part of the leased premises, the lessor
should demand expression of the effect that a partial pooling will
have on the unpooled part of the leased premises. Otherwise, he
may find that the usual pooling clause provision that production
from the unit has the same effect as production from the leased
premises applies with full strength to the unpooled part of his
land.6 6 In such a case all of his leased acreage would be bound by
.production on the unit, but he would be entitled to participate in
that production only to the extent that his acreage contributed to it.
There is a distinct possibility that the lessor may not be able
to effectively write all of the foregoing restrictions into the pooling
clause. For example, a restriction as to the basis of his participation
may, in light of the rule that all pooled leases must grant similar
authority, prove too restrictive to be workable. Furthermore, even
if the lessor's scrivener can foresee and provide for all of the multi-
lateral problems without benefit of the other lessors' points of view,
his draft of the pooling clause may become too unwieldy to be used
in the lease. Therefore, the safer,67 more practicable alternative
65 Some doubt is cast upon this premise by Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Jurek,
248 S.W.2d 294( Tex. Civ. App. 1952) and Fussell v. Rinque, 269 S.W.2d 442
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954). The Jurek case held that the cross-conveyancing
doctrine did not apply to its facts. The Fussell case relied upon Jurek and
held that the owners of all tracts were not necessary parties in an action
to try title to one of several tracts which had been pooled pursuant to a
pooling clause. However, sufficient doubt exists to warrant the conclusion
in the text.
66 Scott v. Pure Oil Co., 194 F.2d 393 (5 Cir. 1952); Gray v. Cameron, 218
Ark. 142, 234 S.W.2d 769 (1951); LeBlanc v. Danciger Oil & Refining Co.,
218 La. 463, 49 So.2d 855 (1950).
67 To the effect that the acceptance of royalties determined on the pooled
basis will constitute a binding ratification of the pooling see Leopard v.
Standard Oil & Gas Co., 220 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Merrill
Engineering Co. v. Capital National Bank of Jackson, 192 Miss. 378, 5 So.2d
666 (1942); and Dobbins v. Hodges, 208 La. 143, 23 So.2d 26 (1945).
COMMUNITY LEASES
is to reject the pooling clause in favor of a separate unitization agree-
ment.
IV. THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT
As a third alternative to competitive tract-by-tract develop-
ment, the parties may enter an agreement that is separate from the
lease and which provides that the reservoir will be developed
according to its terms. Such agreements are governed by the usual
rules of contract law.68
Like most commercial contracts, separate agreements are
tailored to meet the desires of the parties as dictated by their
particular circumstances. Hence, the terms of these agreements vary
from reservoir to reservoir, and there is no standard form for them.
However, all of them are intended to eliminate the waste caused
by competitive tract-by-tract development. They accomplish this
end by offering the opportunity to conserve the natural reservoir
energy, and, thereby, achieve the maximum primary recovery.0 9
Similarly, they offer the opportunity to increase recovery by
secondary70 or tertiary techniques. 71 In addition they offer the
opportunity to eliminate unnecessary wells and storage facilities
and, thereby, decrease the costs of production.
Generally, separate agreements may be divided into two cate-
gories: (1) those under which each tract is developed individually
according to specified standards, and (2) those under which all of
the tracts are developed as a whole.
An agreement of the first type that is in common use among
lessees is the contribution agreement. It usually takes the form of
a "bottom hole letter" or a "dry hole letter."72 In the former, lessee
A agrees to pay a specified sum of money to lessee B, if B will
complete a well of prescribed depth on B's lease and furnish
geological data to A. The "dry hole letter" is similar, except that
A agrees to pay only if B does not discover oil or gas in production
68 Dobbins v. Hodges, supra, note 67; Duff v. DufBose, 27 S.W.2d 122 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1930).
69 Murray, Engineering Aspects of Unit Operation, Third Annual Institute
on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 1,2 (1952).
70 For a brief discussion of the methods of increasing production by the
secondary recovery techniques of injecting gas, water, or oil into the
reservoir see Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law 30 (1955).
71 Tertiary recovery methods involve the injection into the reservoir of
new substances and forces. Voorhees, Techniques of Field Wide Unitization
24 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 14, 15 (1951).
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quantities.7 3 This type of agreement spreads the economic risk of
the driller's well and provides the other lessees with information
indicative of the size of their risks. However, it does not spread the
risk of drilling subsequent wells. Furthermore, the successful com-
pletion of a producing well imposes the duty to competitively
develop their tracts on both the drilling and the non-drilling parties
to the agreement. At best, then this type of agreement can only
postpone the beginning of competitive development.
The lessees may lessen their competition by agreeing, among
themselves, to a specified spacing of wells, a specified rate of with-
drawal of hydrocarbons from a common reservoir, to the use of
specified wells for injection purposes, and so on. However, these
agreements may violate one or more of the implied covenants. 74
Therefore, it is necessary to have the lessors join in these agree-
ments if they are to be effective.
When the lessors do join in this type of agreement, they waive
compliance with so much of their leases as is affected by the agree-
ment. Still, they are entitled to the individual development of their
tracts. 75 Thus, between the parties, this type of agreement has much
the same effect as conservation legislation.
The second type of agreement, in which all of the tracts are
developed as a whole, has a broader affect on the interested parties.
This type of agreement affords the opportunity for complete elim-
ination of competitive waste by collecting all of the individual
royalty interests and allowing them to be developed by one collec-
tive working interest. From the engineering point of view, the result
is much the same as if one person owned all of the surface acreage
overlying a particular reservoir.76
The legal affect of this type of agreement is more complex.
Like the first type of agreement, it will not bind those lessors who
72 Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law 525 (1955). See also Brown,
Assignments of Interests in Oil and Gas Leases, Farm-Out Agreements,
Bottom Hole Letters, Reservations of Overrides and Oil Payments, Fifth
Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 25 (1954).
73 Sullivan, op. cit. supra note 72, 525.
74 Ramsey v. Carter Oil Co., 74 F.Supp. 481 (E.D. Ill. 1947); ajf'd, 172 F.2d
622 (7th Cir. 1949); cert. denied, 337 U.S. 958. Cf. Carter Oil Co. v. Dees,
340 Ill.App. 449, 92 N.E. 519 (1950).
75 Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law 359 (1955).
768 See Murray, op. cit. supra, note 69.
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are not parties to it.77 Furthermore, the consent of a partial-royalty
owner who has the power to lease will not bind the partial-royalty
owner in the same tract who does not have the power to lease.78
The unit will not fail because all of the royalty owners do not agree
to it, 79 but the non-joiners will be entitled to full compliance with
the terms of their leases, including full royalty on all hydrocarbons
which are produced from their tracts.80 Therefore, all interested
lessors will normally be asked to join in the proposed unit.
The agreement that the lessor will usually be asked to sign is
called a royalty owners' agreement. His lessee will normally execute
a separate working interest agreement.8 1 Because the lessees' agree-
ment contains much information that need not concern the lessor,8 2
the discussion which follows considers lessees' agreements only
incidentally.
A. CONTENT
Basically, the royalty owners' agreement provides that each
royalty owner agrees to have his tract developed as a part of a
specified area in accordance with the terms of the working interest
agreement, and that he is to receive a particular share of the pro-
ceeds of the unit.
In agreeing to have his land developed as a part of the unit,
the royalty owner agrees that the terms of his lease shall be modi-
fied. This is usually accomplished by an expression in the unitization
77 Bruce v. Ohio Oil Company, 169 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 913 (1949); Carter v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 213 La. 1028, 36
So.2d 26 (1948); Hood v. Southern Production Co., 206 La. 642, 19 So.2d 336
(1944); Knight v. Chicago Corp., 144 Tex. 98, 188 S.W.2d 564 (1945).
78Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex. 425, 174 S.W.2d 43 (1943), holds that a non-
participating royalty owner is not bound by a community lease which he
does not sign, even though he would be bound by an ordinary lease which
was executed by the participating royalty owner.
79Pinchback v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 242 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951); Smith Petroleum Co. v. Van Mourik, 302 Mlich. 131, 4 N.W.2d 495
(1942). See also Bruce v. Ohio Oil Company and Knight v. Chicago Corp.,
cited in note 72, supra.
80 Smith Petroleum Co. v. Van Mourik, supra, note 74. Contra, Dobson v.
Arkansas Oil & Gas Commission, 218 Ark. 160, 235 S.W.2d 33 (1950).
81 Kirk, Content of Royalty Owners' and Operators' Unitization Agree-
ments, Third Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 19, 29
(1952).
82 Cook, Rights and Remedies of the Lessor and Royalty Owner under A
Unit Operation, Third Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation
101, 111 (1952).
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agreement to the effect that all leases are amended by it.8 3 Another
usual clause provides that for all purposes except the determination
of royalties, production on any part of the unit shall constitute pro-
duction on the lease.8 4 Similarly, it is common for the royalty
owners' agreement to contain a clause which expresses the effect
a surrender of all or part of one of the leases shall have on the
unit .85
Thus modified, the individual leases begin to take on many
of the aspects of a communitized lease. Therefore, it is necessary
to insert an express provision that the cross-conveyancing doctrine
shall not apply. 6
B. THE BASIS OF PARTICIPATION
Of particular interest is the problem of determining the basis
of participation in unit production. The parties must decide whether
they wish to allocate the production on the acreage basis, on the
basis of the relative value of the economically recoverable hydro-
carbons in place under each tract,8 7 or upon a combination of these
factors."" The acreage basis may be inequitable for the reasons
stated above. For those same reasons, any formula that relies in part
upon the surface acreage basis may be inequitable to the extent
that it so relies.
The value of the economically recoverable hydrocarbons in
place basis is more likely to produce an equitable allocation, but
the fairness of this basis is a direct function of the accuracy of the
evaluations of the several tracts. The degree of accuracy is, in turn,
a direct function of the time in the course of the reservoir's develop-
ment that unitization is desired. This is true because the longer a
reservoir has been worked, the more extensive and reliable is the
information that is known about it. These considerations tend to
83 Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law 395 (1955).
84 Ibid.
85 Voorhees, Techniques of Field-Wide Unitization, 24 Rocky Mt. L. Rev.
14, 23 (1951).
86 "A typical provision of this type is that, 'Nothing contained in this
agreement shall be deemed to result in the transfer of all or any part of
any party's legal title in any tract to any other party.'" Hoffman, Volun-
tary Pooling and Unitization 168, note 43, (1954).
87For a discussion of tract valuation, see Roark, Matters of Mutual Con-
cern to the Lawyer and Engineer in the Unitization Agreement, Seventh
Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 255, 289 et seq. (1956).
88 See Voorhees, op. cit. supra, note 85, at 24.
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favor late unitization. However, it is also true that the earlier
unitization occurs, the greater will be its advantages.8 9 In combina-
tion these factors lead to the conclusion that the earlier unitization
is accomplished the better it will be for the parties jointly, and the
worse it will be for the parties severally.
One way to solve this dilemma is to unitize as early as it is
determined that unitization is feasible, but to postpone the deter-
mination of participation until enough geological data to allow an
accurate assessment of the value of the several tracts has been ob-
tained. This method was used successfully in the development of
Benton Field in Louisiana 0 The Benton agreement provided that
the participation would be determined on the basis of the economi-
cally recoverable hydrocarbons in place under each tract. Sufficient
test wells were to be drilled to obtain the data necessary to an
accurate evaluation, but no production was to be allowed from
these wells until all tracts had been evaluated. After each tract was
assayed, the parties were to compare the values and arrive at a
participation formula by unanimous agreement. In the event that
unanimous agreement was not obtained, the participation formula
was to be determined by a specified engineering firm. The agree-
ment also provided that one year after production had been obtained
a second formula would be determined in the same manner as the
first and that this second formula would be retroactive to the
effective date of the agreement. 91 In this way, the parties were able
to obtain the maximum benefit of unitization while insuring each
individual party his fair share of the proceeds.
However, all of the parties may not agree that their fair share
is limited to the relative value of the economically recoverable
hydrocarbons in place under their tracts. For example, the owner
of a tract overlying the compressed gas which, if allowed to expand
toward other tracts would force the oil underlying those tracts to
the surface, may feel that he should be compensated for refraining
from releasing that gas into the atmosphere. Furthermore, unless
he is restricted by statute, the failure to compensate him for his
structural advantage may result in his wasting the reservoir energy,
s9 Murray, Engineering Aspects of Unit Operation, Third Institute on Oil
and Gas Law and Taxation 1, 6-11 (1952). Voorhees, Techniques of Field-
Wide Unitization, 24 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 14,17 (1951).
90 Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law, 375 (1955).
91 Kirk, Content of Royalty Owners' and Operators' Unitization Agree-
ments, Third Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 19, 54-58
(1952).
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thereby preventing the recovery of oil from any of the tracts.2
Therefore, in some situations the participation formula must account
for factors in addition to the relative value of the oil and gas in
place under each tract.
It may be noted that in the negotiation of the relative participa-
tion of each tract, the lessee and his lessor share the same general
position vis-a-vis the other lessees and their lessors. However, this
is not always true, for the interests of the lessee and his lessor may
conflict in the determination of the dollar amount the lessor should
receive from the unit. One such conflict arises if the lessor demands
a share of the expenses that the lessee will save because he does
not have to complete so many wells. Similar conflicts arise in the
determination of the amount of gas on which royalties must be paid
when some of the gas is used for unit purposes and some is not.
9 3
Once these conflicts have been solved and the basis of par-
ticipation has been determined, it is necessary to provide for the
method of payment. Toward that end, the working interest agree-
ment usually contains a provision for the accounting procedures
that will be used in the unit.94 It will also specify whether the
production will be marketed by the unit operator or by the in-
dividual lessees.9 5
C. DETERMINING SIZE
Similar to the problem of determining the participation of the
several parties is the problem of defining the area of the unit.90
This problem has two aspects. First, it is necessary to prescribe the
initial size of the unit. Second, it is necessary to provide for the
expansion and contraction of the unit.
Generally, there are three methods of defining the initial unit
boundaries. The first method limits the original unit to property
that is known to be productive and provides that additional tracts
92 For a brief discussion of structural advantages, see Buckley, Petroleum
Conservation 289 (1951). See also Roark, op. cit. supra, note 87.
93 Merrill, Unitization Problems: The Position of the Lessor, 1 Okla. L. Rev.
119, 123 (1948).
94 Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law 392 (1955).
95 This is one of the many facets of separate agreements which give rise to
problems of taxation. See, Hill, Tax problems Arising Out of Unitization
Agreements, Third Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 427
(1952); and Brabson, Current Tax Problems in the Field of Unitization,
Seventh Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 627 (1956).
96 When the acreage basis is used, the participation and size problems
are completely intertwined.
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may be brought into the unit as their capacity to produce is demon-
strated. This method insures that only valuable tracts are included
in the unit. However, the delay caused by the requirement of pro-
duction deprives the parties of the advantages of early unitization.
Furthermore, this method subjects the unit to the substantial risk
that full scale operation may be delayed or seriously impaired by
the failure to successfully negotiate the enlargement of the unit.97
The second method includes all of the property which may
overlie the reservoir in the original unit, but allows only those
tracts which are known to be productive to participate in the pro-
ceeds of unit production. This method assures the unit of the con-
trol of the reservoir. However, it requires each property owner to
develop his property at his own risk and then turn his interest over
to the unit in return for a proportional part of the whole. Because
of that requirement, it is nearly impossible to negotiate such an
agreement 8
The third method is similar to the second, except that the
development of each of the tracts is carried on at the risk of the
unit. When a tract is proved to be productive, its owners are allowed
to participate in the unit on the basis of its relative value. This, of
course, gives rise to the problems of valuation. Nevertheless, this
type of agreement is easier to negotiate than the second type, and
it assures an even greater control over the development of the
reservoir. 99
Regardless of the method used to define the initial unit
boundaries, the unit agreement should contain specific provisions
for the method of expanding or contracting them. In addition, when
the acreage basis of production is used, and when the cross-con-
veyancing doctrine is not expressly negated by another clause in
the agreement, the contracting clause must detail the effect that a
release of part of the unit will have upon the retained portion of
the unit.100
97 Roark, Matters of Mutual Concern to the Lawyer and Engineer in the
Unitization Agreement, Seventh Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and
Taxation 275, 281 (1956). Voorhees, Techniques of Field-Wide Unitization,
24 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 14, 19 (1951).
9s Roark, op. cit. supra, note 97, at 282.
99 Voorhees, op. cit. supra, note 97, at 19.
100 Voorhees, op. cit. supra, note 85. Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas
Law 397 (1955).
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D. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
The royalty owners' agreement may also contain an infinite
number of other provisions. It may provide for the unit operator's
right to use the surface of each of the tracts. It may provide specific
authority for the unit operator to remove equipment. 1 1 Also, it
may contain provisions providing for covenants of title, assign-
ability, the effect of statutes, and so on.'
0 2
E. EFFECT
This type of agreement, like other contracts, sets the relation-
ship of the parties according to its terms. It does away with the
lessee's obligation to develop each lease individually. However, in-
stead of eliminating the implied covenants, it shifts their operation
from the individual lease to the unit as a whole.
103
V. CONCLUSION
The community lease, the pooling clause, and the separate
agreement all have the same general purpose, viz., to eliminate
the waste caused by competitive tract-by-tract development of oil
and gas reservoirs. The separate agreements are the most effective
because they offer the opportunity for control of the entire reser-
voir, control that may only rarely be achieved through the use of
community leases or pooling clauses. Furthermore, in Nebraska,
the use of a community lease or a pooling clause which does not
express the relationship of the lessors inter se necessarily means
that the definition of that relationship will be realized only after
extensive and hazardous litigation. On the other hand, if the ex-
pression of the lessors' relationship is undertaken in connection with
the negotiation of the initial lease, the importance of that relation-
ship may be over-emphasized and the perspective of the lease may
be distorted. Moreover, if the necessary restrictions are written
into the pooling clause, the lessee may not be able to effectively
pool the lease. Therefore, it appears that the arresting of competitive
tract-by-tract development can best be achieved through the use of
an agreement that is separate from the oil and gas lease.
'O Sullivan, op. cit. supra, note 100.
102 Kirk, Content of Royalty Owners' and Operators' Unitization Agree-
ments, Third Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 19, 52
(1952).
103 Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, 275 P.2d 304 (Okla. 1954),
appeal dismissed, 349 U.S. 909. See also, Merrill, Unitization Problems: The
Position of the Lessor, 1 Okla. L. Rev. 119, 138 (1948).
